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1. INTRODUCTION 
Polish Military Contingent (PMC) 
redeployment from Afghanistan will be one of the 
biggest and most difficult operations for Polish 
Armed Forces logistics and especially for transport 
subsystem carried out by the Movement and 
Transportation Division – National Movement 
coordination Centre. In accordance with 
International Agreements Afghan Operation 
/ISAF/ will be terminated by the end of 20143
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. 
Currently there are negotiations between Polish 
and US sides on the US level of support during 
Polish Forces redeployment from Afghanistan. No 
final agreement was made but nevertheless it is 
still a big issue which can lead to great amounts of 
money spent from the public budget to obtain all 
necessary transportation assets to move back whole 
personnel and equipment. Regardless of the 
outcome of the above mentioned talks, 
Afghanistan redeployment planning is a great 
challenge especially that this phase must be 
coordinated with NATO alliance to avoid any 
blockade of transportation corridors. In the next 
chapters there are the analyses of  potential ways 
of force withdrawal from Afghanistan and 
transport corridors taking into account approximate 
costs, transit time and security4
It should be added that states taking part in 
ISAF operation develop their  own concepts and 
analyses regarding the Afghanistan retrograde. 
During the June 2013 NATO Transportation 
Workshop in Krakow on multimodal transport 
during the military redeployment phase from 
Afghanistan, whose  main purpose was civilian 
support for military
. 
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, none of the countries taking 
part in this workshop provided the withdrawal 
costs, concentrated only on transport options. 
Those options were similar to those presented in 
this article, nevertheless authors’ proposals are 
unique and dedicated mostly to Polish financial 
and transportation means and capabilities and 
obviously to the geographical location. At this 
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stage it is not possible to obtain detailed financial 
data regarding the ISAF military redeployment of 
individual countries. Such documents are classified 
and only after the completion of operations 
planned at the end of 2014, it will be possible to 
reach such information.  
 
2. ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE 
WITHDRAWAL WAYS 
The main overland transportation corridors 
between Afghanistan and Europe will play a very 
important role during ISAF redeployment phase 
because this mode of transport 
is more effective and  much cheaper than airlift. 
There is no time pressure for this kind of operation 
therefore all Ministries of Defence take into 
account economical aspects of it as a primary task. 
Therefore, based on approved concepts, 
capabilities of transportation assets and 
international agreements we can anticipate that 
below corridors will be often used during the ISAF 
withdrawal (Figure 1): 
• North corridor – variant no 1; 
• Central corridor – variant no 2; 
• South corridor – variant no 3; 
• Air corridor – variant no 4. 
The North corridor goes from Afghanistan 
through Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russian 
territory, leading to the Latvian and Lithuanian 
seaports. For the Polish redeployment it can be 
modified and can reach Poland via Ukraine. Due to 
the fact that currently Uzbekistan is hampering 
military movements, there is a bypass through 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This so called KKT 
route leads to the capital of Kyrgyzstan Bishkek 
then goes via Kazakhstan and Russia. 
Unfortunately, because of Russian restriction, this 
corridor can be used only for general cargo. 
Military combat equipment and ammo are strictly 
prohibited. 
The Central corridor was recently modified 
after the Turkmenistan refusal to allow military 
convoys pass this territory.  It goes from North 
Afghanistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to the 
Aktau seaport on the Caspian Sea. There is a ferry 
connection between Aktau (Kazakhstan) and Baku 
(Azerbaijan) then road or rail movement can be 
executed till Poti seaport in Georgia. Second ferry 
on the Black Sea from Poti to Odessa (Ukraine) 
provides connection to  European countries or a 
direct sealift to North America can be organised. 
Another option is to use rail system from Georgia 
via Turkey and Balkans to Poland. The new tunnel 
under Bosphorus which will be finished in 2013 
can facilitate this movement. 
Fig. 1. Possible ISAF redeployment corridors for Polish Army 
Personal elaboration  
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The South corridor goes from Afghanistan to 
the Pakistani seaport Karachi. This section of the 
corridor is extremely dangerous because of threats 
from terrorist attacks. After the US operation on 
Bin Laden hide-away in Pakistan, the situation is 
even more complicated. Karachi is a major seaport 
from where military sealifts can be executed. This 
port was used by Polish Armed Forces during the 
deployment phase to Afghanistan ISAF operation. 
In order to increase security there is an option to 
provide intermodal transport (air-sea) airlifted 
cargo from Afghanistan (e.g. Baghram) to United 
Arab Emirates (e.g. Dubai, Al Fujarah) and then 
sealifted back to Poland or other countries. 
It goes without saying that direct airlift option 
from Afghanistan to Poland is also taken into 
account as a complementary solution specially for 
the troops and sensitive cargo to minimise risk but 
this  option will be limited to the minimum as a 
very cost consuming solution. 
 
3. DEVELOPMENT                                            
OF REDEPLOYMENT OPTIONS 
3.1 Transit time analysis 
As mentioned above transit time is not              
a dominated factor for Afghanistan redeployment 
operation. Nevertheless, to show all aspects of this 
operation, below there is a very simplified analysis 
of movement times without any rests, 
transhipments, customs formalities or transport 
assets readiness times. Those theoretical transit 
times in reality are much longer if we take into 
considerations all the above factors. 
The North corridor (variant no 1) was divided 
into two phases (Figure 2). The first phase is a road 
transport from Afghanistan to Kyrgyzstan and the 
second phase from Kyrgyzstan to Poland via 
Kazakhstan and Russia by road or rail. Minimum 
transit time for this variant is 34 days.  
 
Figure 3 shows typical road and rail infrastructure 
of the North corridor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Minimum transit time of road/rail transport: (left) from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan, (right)  from 
 Uzbekistan to Poland 
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 The second variant – the Central corridor is 
divided into several phases to calculate time of 
equipment movement (Figure 4). Analysis shows 
that minimum transit time is 25 days. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The seaports infrastructure on the Caspian and 
Black Seas (variant no 2) is shown on Figures 5. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Rail and road infrastructure in Kazakhstan. 
Photos: Dariusz Janasz 
 
  
 
Fig. 4. Minimum transit time of road/rail transport: 
(left) from Afghanistan to Azerbaijan, (right) from Azerbaijan to Poland 
Personal elaboration  
 
  
 
Fig. 5. Rail and road infrastructure in Kazakhstan. 
Photos: Dariusz Janasz 
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The South corridor is a third redeployment 
variant which is taken into account and for transit 
time analysis is divided into  two phases (Figure 
6). The first phase  is a road transport through 
Afghan and Pakistani territories and the second 
one this is the sealift from Karachi to Poland. 
Analysis shows that minimum transit time is 24 
days. In the Figure 7 there is an example of the 
infrastructure in case of variant no 3. 
In case of airlift (variant no 4) assuming that 
there are approx. 500 containers and approx. 300 
trucks and two AN-124 per day are at our disposal, 
whole equipment would be moved back within 40 
days. Of course in practice it is not possible firstly 
because not every oversized equipment can be 
transported by this kind of aircraft, secondly 
because the availability of AN-124 is limited and 
the cost of using them will ruin the MOD budget. 
This mode of transport is the most expensive one 
and surprisingly not the fastest.    
Based on the above transit time analyses of 
different corridors we can assume that minimum 
cargo transit time via chosen corridor is 
approximately 24-30 days. In practice this time is 
sometimes doubled or tripled. To calculate real 
whole contingent redeployment time from 
Afghanistan to Poland it is necessary to take into 
account availability of transport assets in different 
Fig. 6. Minimum transit time road/sea: 
(left) from Afghanistan to Pakistan, (right) from Pakistan to Poland 
Personal elaboration  
 
  
 
Fig.7. Road in Afghanistan and Al Fujarah seaport (UAE) 
Photos: Dariusz Janasz 
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options and capacity of corridors. As of today such 
data is not available to complete calculation. 
 
3.2 Transport costs and security 
Cost of transport is one of the most critical 
factors which has to be considered during the 
Afghanistan redeployment planning. There is 
always a dilemma of how to move contingent in 
the most effective and safest way. The costs of 
transport for the above mentioned options are well 
known for military transport specialists. It does not 
matter whether they are military 
or commercial assets. The overland movement 
price for one 20’ container is between 10 000 and 
15 000 EUR and 40 000 EUR for the air transport. 
It is easy to calculate taking into account different 
variants that redeployment of contingent’s whole 
equipment will cost approx. 14 million EUR plus 
costs of passenger aircraft for personnel.  
Personnel safety is the highest priority for 
Polish MOD therefore troops will be moved back 
using the air system. Equipment based on its value, 
dimensions and importance will be transported by 
different corridors which are not always secured. 
To calculate risk of the above mentioned 
variants it is also necessary, the same as for the 
transit times, to divide different corridors into 
phases. The first phase of all variants is very 
dangerous especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
The South corridor to Karachi is extremely 
dangerous as being threatened by terrorist attacks. 
After the US operation on Bin Laden hide-away in 
Pakistan the situation is more complicated. 
Therefore some type of cargo can be airlifted from 
Afghanistan to the United Arab Emirates. The 
second phase – sealift is very safe. The Central and 
North corridors are quite safe. There are no 
terrorist attacks threats in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia from Al-Kaida side and  
Poland has good relations with those countries. 
Variant no 4 – airlift of course is the safest but 
very expensive.  
 
4. SUMMARY 
 The type and dimensions of military equipment 
will determine the choice of redeployment option. 
There is no doubt that because of security and 
transit time Polish troops will be moved by air. For 
the equipment decision is needed which of them is 
strategic, sensitive or typical general cargo. 
Analysis of possible redeployment options allows 
to create the following conclusions: 
• Road – sea transport concept executed via 
the South corridor can be used for heavy 
equipment, oversize cargo and all types of 
containers; 
• Rail or road transport concept via the 
Central and North corridors can be used only 
for container movements of general cargo;  
• Air – sea transport concept is a airlift of 
strategic goods from Afghanistan to so 
called saved country (in our case UAE) to 
avoid any terrorist attacks on Afghani or 
Pakistani territory and sealift to the final 
destination; 
• Direct airlift is a primary concept of 
personnel redeployment. It can also be used 
for  high value or sensitive cargo, crypto 
equipment and ammunition. 
All concepts have to be agreed by international 
community and require transit countries diplomatic 
clearances, which sometimes is not easy. 
Unfortunately Polish diplomacy not always 
follows  the military needs.     
 
Experience which Polish military logistics will 
take from ISAF redeployment operation is crucial. 
This is the next such complicated logistic operation 
after Iraq and Chad.   Incoming operation is not 
easy but Polish military specialists based on 
previous experiences will for sure fulfil the tasks. 
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